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The conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can only
mean one thing—one person, one vote.
Justice William O. Douglas,
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
I. INTRODUCTION
One person, one vote.  To most Americans, this phrase is more than a
simple slogan.  It has become a long-standing principle of democracy and
is the basis for nearly universal suffrage in the United States.  The princi-
ple that all citizens are entitled to equal legislative representation was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims.1  In Reynolds, the
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1. 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).  In this legislative apportionment case, voters alleged that
despite the vast amount of population growth that had occurred in Alabama from 1900 to
1960, there had been no reapportionment since 1900. Id. at 540.  Voters asserted that many
counties had become the victims of arduous discrimination because the legislature had not
followed the Alabama Constitution which prescribed decennial reapportionment of the
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Court found that the state must apportion seats on a population basis for
both houses of the Alabama legislature.2  Apportioning representation
ensures the voting power of each voter is equal.3  In Reynolds’ majority
decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren said: “Legislators represent people,
not trees or acres.  Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or
economic interests.”4  The Court went on to explain that “[w]eighting the
votes of citizens differently, by any method or means,” is far from justifia-
ble.5 Reynolds was decided one year before the Voting Rights Act was
passed in 1965.  The purpose of the Act is to outlaw discriminatory voting
practices and to extend Reynolds’ “one person, one vote” principle to all
Americans regardless of their race.6  Today, this democratic principle has
evolved into “one person, six votes” for residents of the Village of Port
Chester, New York when choosing their city council.7  A new cumulative
voting scheme was ordered by a federal judge as a remedy for a Voting
Rights Act violation.8  The effect of cumulative voting in this small com-
legislature. Id.  The Supreme Court explained that the right to direct representation was
“a bedrock of our political system” and found that both houses of bicameral legislatures
had to be apportioned on a population basis. Id. at 562.
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
3. See id. at 577 (highlighting excerpts from the Supreme Court’s decision in Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), a congressional districting case that was decided just four
months before Reynolds).  The Court explained that although it is impossible to have com-
pletely identical legislative districts, states are required to make “an honest and good faith
effort” to create districts that are of equal population. Id. See also Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 7–8, 18 (1964) (explaining that “equal representation for equal numbers of
people” was the primary objective of the Constitution in regard to the House of Repre-
sentatives).  In Wesberry, the Court held that population equality among districts is the
constitutional test to determine if a districting scheme is valid. Id. at 18.  The Court also
established that equal representation for all people is a fundamental principle of govern-
ment. Id. at 40.
4. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
5. Id. at 563.
6. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (codifying the guarantee of the
Fifteenth Amendment which prohibits “denial or abridgement of the right of any citi-
zen . . . to vote on account of race or color”).  The Act was adopted in response to contin-
ued discrimination against African-Americans in the South who were trying to exercise
their right to vote. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro.php (last visited Sept. 3,
2011).  The Act applied measures to get rid of state-imposed restrictions, such as literacy
tests, that impaired the right to vote. Id.  Amended in 1970, 1975, and 1982, the Act is seen
by many as the “most successful piece of civil rights legislation ever adopted by the United
States Congress.” Id.
7. Fox News Distorts Facts to Attack Election of First Latino to NY Village’s Legisla-
ture, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (June 16, 2010), http://mediamatters.org/research/
201006160053.  Jarrett asserted that allowing individual voters to vote six times for one
candidate is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Id.
8. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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munity means each voter has six votes to cast in the election that can be
apportioned in any manner including casting all six of one’s votes for only
one candidate.9
As opposed to the current straight voting system where candidates, like
city council members, are elected from specific voting districts, voters are
limited to voting for candidates in their district, and the candidate with
the highest number of votes wins, cumulative voting allows voters to vote
for candidates running outside of a voter’s district.10  Although propo-
nents argue that the movement away from limiting voters to their own
districts dispels gerrymandering—or the practice of purposely drawing
districts along racial lines—the implementation of vote plumping—or
casting all of your votes for one candidate11 has left many citizens won-
dering if cumulative voting is the best way to ensure an equitable govern-
ment system.12
Cumulative voting was mandated in Port Chester after the U.S. Justice
Department filed a lawsuit charging that Port Chester’s voting system il-
legally diminished Hispanic influence by denying equal opportunities in
the election process.13  The Justice Department alleged that the voting
process denied the Hispanic population an adequate opportunity to par-
ticipate in the election process despite the fact that Port Chester’s popula-
tion of 28,000 is almost half Hispanic.14  Judge Robinson of the Southern
District of New York accepted the village’s cumulative voting proposal
after concluding the village had met all three preconditions established by
the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles15 as guidelines for determin-
9. Id. at 447.
10. See Michael McCann, A Vote Cast; A Vote Counted: Quantifying Voting Rights
Through Proportional Representation in Congressional Elections, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, 191, 191–93 (2002) (providing an assessment of proportional representation).  Mc-
Cann argues that proportional voting systems provide an attractive alternative to straight
voting because they offer a greater incentive for minority groups to vote and allow minori-
ties increased access to legislative positions. Id. at 212. See also LANI GUINIER, Groups,
Representation, and Race Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, in THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
151–52 (1994) (arguing that legislative representatives should be elected using cumulative
voting from multi-member districts instead of using plurality voting from single-member
districts).
11. Vote plumping is the main strategy employed by minorities to elect candidates of
their choice under a system of cumulative voting. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at
447.
12. See McCann, supra note 10, at 194 (arguing that “proportional representation of-
fers several enhancements over the winner-take-all-system, particularly in relation to im-
proving the political voice of minority groups”).
13. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
14. Id. at 416, 419.
15. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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ing claims concerning Voting Rights Act violations.16  Once all three of
the Gingles threshold factors have been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, the court must then conclude that based on “‘the totality of
the circumstances, the challenged practice impairs the ability of the mi-
nority voters to participate equally in the political process.’”17  If the two-
step inquiry is satisfied, a court is required to accept the defendant’s rem-
edy for a Voting Rights Act violation if it is legally acceptable.18
This is not the first time a system of cumulative voting has been imple-
mented in lieu of a traditional straight voting scheme.19  However, it is
the first time cumulative voting has been imposed and maintained at the
federal level.  Cumulative voting originated in the corporate board room
as a way of protecting minority owners’ interests and has since been used
in many local elections for city and county governments and school
boards.20  In Texas, over fifty-seven jurisdictions adopted cumulative vot-
16. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (listing three necessary preconditions
used to determine if the Voting Rights Act had been violated); see also Thornburg v. Gin-
gles, 478 U.S. 30, 46, 50 (1986) (holding that in order to succeed on a vote dilution claim
under the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs must first establish that the minority group “is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district”).
17. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (explaining that the satisfaction of the
Gingles preconditions is only the first step in a two-step inquiry) (citation omitted); John-
son v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1002 (1994) (focusing on the “totality of circumstances” as
articulated in Gingles); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 (noting that an examination of certain fac-
tors are necessary to determine if a Voting Rights Act violation has occurred).  These fac-
tors are based on a Senate Judiciary Committee Report that supplemented the 1973
amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at
418; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37.  While this report contained numerous relevant factors, the
Gingles Court stated that they were “neither comprehensive nor exclusive.” Gingles, 478
U.S. at 45.
18. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48 (explaining that the defendant
jurisdiction is given the first chance to correct a Voting Rights Act violation by proposing
their own remedy).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 771 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (implementing a system of limited voting for the school board election); Cousin
v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686, 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding a system of cumulative
voting to be a possible remedy for impermissible vote dilution); Cane v. Worcester Cnty.,
Md., 847 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Md. 1994) (imposing a system of cumulative voting for the
county commissioner election).
20. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative
Voting, 94 COLUM L. REV. 124, 127 (1994). Cumulative voting became an option for cities
such as Amarillo in 1995 when then-governor George W. Bush signed legislation that al-
lowed school districts in Texas to adopt proportional systems such as cumulative voting and
limited voting in their local elections. The History of Cumulative Voting in Amarillo,
FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=247 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).  Since then,
Amarillo has become the largest jurisdiction in the United States to implement cumulative
voting after initially adopting the system for its school board elections in 2000. Id.  In the
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ing as a remedy to Voting Rights Act suits between 1991 and 2000.21  In
Illinois, cumulative voting was used in lower house elections from 1870 to
1980; however, voters abolished the system in reaction to the slogan,
“[f]ire [fifty-nine] lousy politicians with one shot,” and majority voting
remains in place today.22
Cumulative voting is controversial because it changes the basic princi-
ple underlying universal suffrage in America.  In this Comment, I will
examine cumulative voting in the context of the Voting Rights Act, and
make a comparison to the current at-large, district-based elections used in
the majority of states today.  I will focus on the history and effect of cu-
mulative voting on all citizens to determine to what extent this process
fosters minority representation, if at all, whether there are unintended
consequences, and how any such consequences weigh for or against cu-
mulative voting as a remedy for Voting Rights Act violations.
II. SUFFRAGE AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
There is no individual right to vote in the United States Constitution.
When the United States was founded, only White men over the age of
twenty-one who owned property were typically allowed to vote.23  By not
addressing the suffrage issue more specifically, the authors of the Consti-
tution set the stage for an interminable struggle over voting rights.24  Al-
though most economic impediments to voting had disappeared by the
mid-1850s,25 the road to nearly universal suffrage has been a long one.
Passed by Congress in 1869 and ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amend-
2000 elections, an African-American candidate was elected for the very first time and a
Hispanic candidate was elected for the first time since the seventies. Id.
21. The History of Cumulative Voting in Amarillo, supra note 20.
22. Cumulative Voting—Illinois, NEW RULES PROJECT, http://www.newrules.org/gov-
ernance/rules/proportional-representation/cumulative-voting-illinois (last visited Sept. 6,
2011).  In 2005, the Midwest Democracy Center campaigned to reestablish a system of
cumulative voting for the Illinois House of Representatives by introducing a bill to amend
the Illinois Constitution. Id.  The goal of the bill was to have cumulative voting in place by
the 2008 election. Id.  This campaign was unsuccessful.
23. Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, CW J., Spring 2007, available at http://
www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Spring07/elections.cfm.  In this article, Crews de-
scribes the first election and the establishment of voting rights in early America. Id.  When
the United States was founded, most of the nation was excluded from voting, including
Native Americans, women, most African-Americans, men who were under the age of
twenty-one, and White males without property. Id.  These voting restrictions stemmed
from eighteenth-century England where the male-only electorate held strong beliefs about
the incompetency of both women and minorities. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
526 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:521
ment guaranteed the right to vote to African-American men.26  However,
this guarantee was short-lived for most former slaves, as many states re-
sponded to this new amendment by passing laws to restrict the newfound
freedom of African-American voters.27  Known as the Black Codes, these
laws advocated the use of literacy tests and poll taxes to suppress the
African-American vote.28  Although women’s suffrage was proposed in
1848, it wasn’t until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920
that women finally won the right to vote.29
It has been over a century since the Supreme Court described the right
to universal suffrage as fundamental because it is ‘“preservative of all
rights.’”30  This principle has remained strong throughout history.31 As
the Court stated in Wesberry v. Sanders32 in 1964: “Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”33  There has
been a lot of progress since voting rights were first described as funda-
mental and obstacles that restrict a citizen’s right to vote have been pro-
hibited by law at the federal, state, and local level.34  However, although
26. “The right of citizens of the United States shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.  The Fifteenth Amendment was the last of three Reconstruc-
tion Amendments implemented to protect the rights of African-Americans.  See MICHAEL
BURGAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 6 (Julie Gassman ed., 2006).  These
amendments were passed as part of Reconstruction, a program created by Northern
lawmakers to help rebuild the South after the Civil War. Id. at 6–7.  The abolition of
slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment (which included a
redefinition of citizenship, and the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses) faced much opposition. Id. at 18; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV
(for the full text of the amendments).  However, in the end they were successful in restruc-
turing the United States to extend all constitutionally guaranteed rights to the entire male
population. BURGAN, supra at 18.
27. BURGAN, supra note 26, at 13.
28. Id. at 13–14.  The Black Codes were similar to the Slave Codes which existed
before the abolition of slavery and were used to keep newly freed slaves dependent on
their former masters. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting each state and the federal government from
denying the right to vote based on sex); Kris Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits
and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1980 (1994).
30. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 at 51
(2009) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
31. Id.
32. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting both Congress and the states from condi-
tioning the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other types of tax).
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was proposed by Congress in 1962 and ratified in 1964.
The Constitution of the United States: Amendments 11-27, THE CHARTERS OF FREEDOM,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 6, 2011).
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all citizens earned this fundamental right, the right to vote continued to
be illusory for many Americans because Southern legislators resisted vot-
ing rights legislation long after the passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.35  As a result, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 which
has been regarded by many as “the most successful piece of civil rights
legislation ever adopted by the United States Congress.”36
The Voting Rights Act was created to protect the right to vote as guar-
anteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment by giving minority voters an opportunity to engage in the
electoral process free from discrimination.37  Section 238 and Section 539
of the Act are of particular importance for the analysis of this Comment.
Section 2 of the Act consists of a broad ban on discriminatory voting
practices across the nation by focusing not only on voting systems that are
intended to be racially discriminatory, but also on those that have proven
to have a racially discriminatory impact.40  It prohibits all jurisdictions
from establishing a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or stan-
dard, practice or procedure . . . in a manner which results in the denial or
abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”41  Sec-
tion 5 of the Act aims to prevent voting rights violations before they start
by requiring certain states to clear any changes to their election proce-
dures with the U.S. Attorney General to ensure that they do not have a
discriminatory purpose or effect before allowing them to become law.42
In 1982 Congress amended Section 2 to provide that a plaintiff did not
have to prove discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of the sec-
tion.43  The 1982 amendments also codified a “totality of circumstances”
standard to determine if a challenged procedure effectively limited the
right to vote.44
While the Voting Rights Act eliminated formal exclusions and gave
members of minority groups a legally recognized right to vote, the issue
35. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 6.
36. Id.; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973) (“An Act to enforce the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment to the Constitution of
the United States and for other purposes.”).
37. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 6.
38. Voting Rights Act of 1965,  § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).
39. Id.
40. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 6.
41. § 2, 79 Stat. at 437
42. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c); Introduction to Federal Voting
Rights Laws, supra note 6.
43. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, Sec. 3, § 2(a), 96 Stat.
131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG-
ISLATURES, supra note 30, at 53.
44. Sec. 3, § 2(b), 96 Stat. at 134.
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has now become whether this right is an effective tool to ensure that mi-
nority groups have a fair chance to have their interests represented.45
The focus shifted from universal suffrage to equitable voting systems
when racial gerrymandering became commonplace in the 1990s in re-
sponse to the Voting Rights Act.46  In an attempt to prevent violations of
the Act, the Department of Justice began encouraging states subject to
Section 5 preclearance to draw redistricting plans to create “major-
ity–minority” districts in an attempt to prevent violations of the Voting
Rights Act.47  The current design and the one used most often to elect
our local, state, and federal legislatures requires the winning candidate to
garner either a plurality or a majority of the votes in a district to ensure
representation is apportioned according to local geographic areas.48  The
basis for this process is the concept of “one person, one vote” with new
district boundary lines being drawn every ten years based on the census
as required by the Constitution.49  When states began to draw redistrict-
ing plans to create new districts in which members of a racial or language
minority group consisted of a majority of the population (major-
ity–minority districts) some of the districts obtained “bizarre shapes that
caused them to be labeled ‘racial gerrymanders.’”50
Racial gerrymandering is defined as “‘the deliberate and arbitrary dis-
tortion of district boundaries . . . for [racial] purposes.’”51  It exists when
45. See Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 424–25 (1995) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994)) (describ-
ing issues to which Guinier takes objection in the electoral process created by the Voting
Rights Act and its subsequent amendments).
46. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 30, at 71.  The National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) is a bipartisan organization that accommodates
legislators throughout the United States with up-to-date research and analysis on a vast
array of legal issues. Id.  For more information about the organization itself, see the NCSL
website. About Us: National Conference of State Legislatures, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/AboutUs/tabid/305/Default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 6 2011).
47. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 30, at 71.
48. Briffault, supra note 45, at 428.
49. Michael D. Robbins, Gerrymander and the Need for Redistricting Reform, FRAUD
FACTOR, http://www.fraudfactor.com/ffgerrymander.html#article (last revised Jan. 2, 2007)
(discussing redistricting under the subheading “Gerrymander Violates the Fairness
Principle”).
50. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 30, at 53.
51. Id. at 71 (quoting Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993)); see also
Robbins, supra note 49 (defining gerrymandering as “an abuse of the redistricting process
to draw election district boundaries that give a significant unfair and undeserved vote
count advantage in future elections to the majority political party, which controls the redis-
tricting process, and to incumbent politicians of all political parties”).  Gerrymandering is
not a recent phenomenon.  Id. The word itself was created in 1812 in response to a bizarre
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race is a legislature’s dominant rationale for drawing district lines and was
first used in the South to instigate racial discrimination in response to the
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.52  The boundary of Tuskegee, Ala-
bama in 1960 is a prime example of this type of districting.  In an attempt
to limit African-American representation in Congress, the boundary was
redrawn “‘from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure’” to ex-
pel African-Americans from the city.53  The redistricting that followed
the 1990 decennial census was used in the opposite way in an effort to
increase minority representation instead of limiting it.54  Many suits were
filed in federal district court arguing that these redistricting plans violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55  The first
case to reach the Supreme Court was Shaw v. Reno,56 challenging North
Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan.57  Numerous North Carolina
residents objected to the new district created in the plan, asserting that it
concentrated a majority of Black voters in an arbitrary manner.58  The
Court explained that the racial gerrymandering claims must be examined
against the backdrop of this country’s long history of racial discrimination
in voting and commented on the peculiar shape of the minority district
stating that “reapportionment is one area in which appearances do mat-
ter.”59  The Court found that if a redistricting map is “so bizarre on its
face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race,’” it must be held
to the standard of strict scrutiny.60  In similar cases that followed Shaw,
the Supreme Court established procedures to follow in evaluating racial
gerrymandering challenges to majority–minority redistricting plans.61
election district formulated by Elbridge Gerry, an American political leader. Id.  The cre-
ated district resembled a salamander and the word “gerrymander” was coined after Gerry
expressed his support for the redistricting bill. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640, 113 (1993)).
54. Id.
55. See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576 (1997) (asserting that a reappor-
tioned district violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
958 (1996) (alleging that the majority of newly created congressional districts in Texas vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment by racial gerrymandering).
56. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
57. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 30, at 71.
58. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 637 (1993).
59. Id.  The Court explained that the district “winds in snake like fashion through
tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it gobbles in enough en-
claves of black neighborhoods.’” Id. at 635–36.
60. Id. at 644 (1993) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1996)).
61. The Supreme Court curtailed race-based districting and other forms of racial ger-
rymandering while establishing procedures to follow when assessing such claims in many
decisions at this time. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (applying strict
530 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:521
This procedure puts the burden of proving that a redistricting plan was
racially gerrymandered on the plaintiff who is challenging the constitu-
tionality of the plan.62  Once the plaintiff proves this, the court must ap-
ply strict scrutiny to determine whether the state had a compelling
governmental interest in creating the majority–minority district.63  It is
important to note that although the Supreme Court has held several ma-
jority–minority redistricting plans unconstitutional using this procedure,
the Court has made it clear that race-conscious redistricting is not always
unconstitutional.64
Section 2 cases have primarily addressed claims that certain political
procedures such as the placement of minority groups into multi-member
districts, packing minorities into a single district, and fracturing minorities
into multiple districts have made the political process unequal for minori-
ties.65  Each one of these methods of districting may have a negative ef-
fect on minority voting strength.66  Minority voting strength is easily
diluted in multimember district systems by placing the minority group in
a larger multi-member district that has a greater population of majority
voters.67  As a result, minority voters will be unable to elect their pre-
ferred candidate because of the overwhelming population of majority
voters.  The validity of multi-member districts has been challenged in
many vote dilution cases both before and after the 1982 amendments.68
However, courts continue to hold that these districts are not per se un-
constitutional, but may violate Section 2 if the districting results in a de-
nial of equal opportunity to take part in the electoral process.69  Packing
scrutiny and explaining that “for strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that
other, legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race” (quoting Miller v. John-
son, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995))); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 927 (explaining that the excessive
use of race in districting causes societal harm by turning electorates into racial blocs which
makes it necessary to make a distinction between “being aware of radical considerations
and being motivated by them”); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995) (finding
that in order to state a racial gerrymander claim a plaintiff must have been personally
subjected to the racial classification).
62. Shaw, 509 U.S. 659–60; see also Hays, 515 U.S. at 744 (explaining that any citizen
that has been harmed by a racial classification will have standing if they can prove they
have been personally injured by the classification).
63. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
64. Id. at 642.
65. LYDIA QUARLES, THE JOHN C. STENNIS INST. OF GOV’T, POLICY MATTERS: CON-
SIDERING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 at 4 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.msgovt.org/modules/cms/images/thumb/274.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see, e.g., Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1409–10 (7th Cir. 1984) (“There
appears to be no difference in the practical result or in the available remedy regardless of
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districts is another method that is often challenged as a violation of the
Voting Rights Act.  Packing can be easily established by drawing district
lines along racially segregated housing patterns in order to concentrate as
many minority voters into a single electoral district to reduce their influ-
ence in other districts.70  This strategy can also minimize the ability of
minorities to elect candidates of their choice.
The first time the Supreme Court applied the amended Voting Rights
Act to a Section 2 claim was in Thornburg v. Gingles, in which the Court
addressed a third type of impermissible vote dilution known as fractur-
ing.71  Fracturing occurs by splitting minority voters from another concen-
tration of minority voters and adding them to a large majority district;
this often creates a voting polarity which minimizes the ability of the frac-
tured group to elect a candidate of its choice.72  In Gingles, the Court
held that in order to succeed on a vote dilution claim under Section 2,
plaintiffs must: (1) establish that a minority group is “sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district,” (2) that the minority group is politically cohesive, and (3) with-
out special circumstances, bloc voting by the White majority usually
defeats the minority’s preferred candidate.73  Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, rejected the previous test of intent to discriminate and af-
firmed that to decide whether a violation of Section 2 has occurred, a
court must determine if “‘as a result of the challenged practice or struc-
ture plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the polit-
ical processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’”74  Justice Brennan
also indicated that the proper way to determine this is to assess the im-
pact of the contested practice in regard to the “totality of circumstances”
based on seven objective factors developed by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.75
how the resulting discrimination is characterized.”); United States v. Marengo Cnty.
Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that at-large elections are not
directly prohibited; however, any practice that denies an individual the right to vote based
on race violates the Voting Rights Act); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 385 (5th
Cir. 1984) (finding that bloc voting is not in itself unconstitutional).
70. See Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(“Packing occurs when a minority group is concentrated into one or more districts so that
it constitutes an overwhelming majority in those districts (and part of its vote is
‘wasted”).”).
71. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
72. See Rybicki, 574 F. Supp. at 1093 (describing fracturing as occurring “when a geo-
graphically unified minority group is unnecessarily split between a number of districts”).
73. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
74. Id. at 44 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36 (1982)).
75. Id. at 36–37 (explaining the procedure for determining violations of the Voting
Rights Act).  The totality of circumstances factors were determined by the Senate Judiciary
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In numerous cases since, the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify
the Gingles factors.  For example, in Growe v. Emison,76 the Court deter-
mined that the Gingles vote dilution claim preconditions apply not only
to single-member districts, but also to multi-member or at-large dis-
tricts.77  The Court’s opinion in Growe is also significant because it deter-
mined that voting age population is the best measurement to use when
examining a Section 2 claim.78  One year after the Growe decision, the
Court in Johnson v. De Grandy79 rejected an absolute rule that would bar
Section 2 claims if the number of majority–minority districts is propor-
tionate to the minority group’s share of the relevant voting age popula-
tion.80  To reach this conclusion, the Court ignored the first prong of the
Gingles test and instead focused on the totality of circumstances.81  Since
Committee as a supplement to the 1973 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and include:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivi-
sion that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote,
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large elec-
tion districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivi-
sion bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial ap-
peals; [and]
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37.
76. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
77. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993).  Although the Court determined that the
Gingles preconditions did apply to both single- and multi-member districts, the Court dis-
covered that the district court had completely ignored the threshold factors and instead
jumped directly to the totality of circumstances analysis. Id. at 37–38.  Because a Section 2
violation requires a plaintiff to prove that racial bloc voting exists and there was no evi-
dence of such voting cohesion in these districts, the Court found that there was no Voting
Rights Act violation in the first place. Id. at 42.
78. Id. at 39 n.4 (noting that a district’s minority voting age population is the appropri-
ate standard to use when assessing the validity of a Section 2 claim); see also Romero v.
City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that only minority
voters possess the requisite potential to have their vote diluted).
79. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
80. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994).
81. Id. at 1008–10.
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the Court’s decision to implement strict scrutiny as enunciated in Shaw,
the Court has determined that a district that is not reasonably compact
cannot remedy a perceived Section 2 violation because it fails to satisfy
the first threshold requirement of the Gingles standard.82
Although the Gingles preconditions have been interpreted in a variety
of ways, the three-part test, combined with an objective evaluation of the
totality of circumstances, continues to be the proper method to determine
a Voting Rights Act violation.83  Because the Act gives the district court
the broad discretionary authority to implement an adequate remedy that
fully alleviates the underlying violation, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine what constitutes a proper remedy for a Section 2 violation.84  After
discovering a Section 2 violation, districts courts must give the defendant
jurisdiction the first chance to create an acceptable remedial plan; if the
proffered plan is legally acceptable, the court is required to accept and
enforce the remedy.85  Therefore, after a determination of illegal vote di-
lution,86 a district court’s remedial authority seems to be open-ended, as
any legal remedy that aids in correcting the vote dilution becomes a feasi-
ble option.87  This broad authority was exemplified most recently in
United States v. Village of Port Chester,88 when Judge Robinson ordered
an alternative electoral system known as cumulative voting as a remedy
to a Voting Rights Act violation.  Mandatory cumulative voting
originated in 1870 when the Illinois Constitution was revised to require
cumulative voting for both the election of the Illinois House of Repre-
sentatives and the election of directors for corporations throughout the
82. See Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative
Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 356 (1998)
(explaining that the Shaw restrictions also apply to the implementation of alternative vot-
ing systems because “no court has done so in circumstances where it was impossible to
draw a reasonably compact single-member district”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 357.
85. Id.
86. The Role of Section 2—Redistricting & Vote Dilution, REDRAWINGTHELINES.ORG,
http://www.redrawingthelines.org/redistrictingvotedilution (explaining that “[p]ractices
that have the effect of depriving minority voters of an equal opportunity to elect a candi-
date of choice constitute minority vote dilution”); see also Robert Farley, Comment,
Preventing Unconstitutional Gerrymandering: Escaping the Intent/Effects Quagmire, 38 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 397, 397–98 (2008) (explaining that there are permissible and impermis-
sible forms of vote dilution, which can be either direct or indirect).  Gerrymandering can
cut both ways, both for and against minorities, depending on if the employed mechanism is
normal, non-partisan redistricting or unconstitutional gerrymandering. Id. at 398.
87. Mulroy, supra note 82, at 358.
88. 704 F. Supp 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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state.89  The goal was to protect minority interests from abuse of power
by the majority, especially in situations when being a member of the
board gave the minority the information needed to police against fraud.90
The late 1940s marked the height of this type of voting when twenty-two
states adopted mandatory cumulative voting procedures for private cor-
porations.91  However, by 1992 mandatory cumulative voting was main-
tained in only six states; forty-four states chose to adopt the permissive
form; and one state (Massachusetts) completely banned cumulative vot-
ing.92  In fact, no significant corporate law jurisdiction has continued to
implement a system of mandatory cumulative voting as they found that
elimination of such a system served shareholders’ interests and protected
minority interests in a more equitable manner.93  Mandatory cumulative
voting was also rejected in the electoral context when voters in Illinois
abolished the system in 1980 in order to save money and increase compe-
tition for state house seats.94
Cumulative voting has primarily been used in local elections for city
and county governments and school boards.  Under this proportional sys-
tem, voters get multiple votes to cast and can spread them among candi-
dates or concentrate them on one or more candidates.  If there are five
seats to fill, voters will get five votes and will be allowed to give all of
those votes to one candidate or distribute them among several candi-
dates.95  Proponents of this method argue that this system preserves the
benefits of at-large elections while addressing the problem of minority
exclusion.96  Also, some courts have expressed support for the use of cu-
mulative voting as a valid alternative to single-member districts.97  How-
89. Gordon, supra note 20, at 142 (explaining that cumulative voting has “fallen into
great disfavor” in the corporate world).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 145.
92. Id. at 145–46 (illustrating the rise and fall of cumulative voting in the corporate
setting throughout the United States).  Gordon explains that cumulative voting is rarely
used in large public corporations. Id. at 165–66.  In fact, even the states that chose to
maintain the permissive form of cumulative voting rarely, if ever, employ it. Id.
93. Id. at 158, 165.
94. See Cumulative Voting—Illinois, supra note 22 (explaining that in a typical elec-
tion using cumulative voting, each district would only have one candidate running from the
minority party and two from the majority party).
95. The History of Cumulative Voting in Amarillo, supra note 20 (explaining the vari-
ous ways in which a voter can cast their votes under a system of cumulative voting); see
also Mulroy, supra note 82, at 341 (providing the mathematical formula to determine the
ability of minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice using cumulative voting).
96. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1463 (1991).
97. Mulroy, supra note 82, at 358.
2011] CUMULATIVE VOTING 535
ever, in McGhee v. Granville County,98 the Fourth Circuit cast doubt on
using a system of cumulative voting as a remedial course, explaining that
Gingles implies that the universe of Section 2 remedies is limited to sin-
gle-member districts.99  Nonetheless, because using districting as a rem-
edy allows those who draw the boundaries to have an inordinate amount
of control over electoral outcomes, it is easy to see why many citizens are
deeply concerned about how to obtain effective and non-discriminatory
voting practices as remedies for Voting Rights Act violations.
III. CUMULATIVE VOTING AS A REMEDY
The implementation of cumulative voting in the Village of Port Chester
marks the first time this remedy has been ordered and approved in the
electoral context at the federal level.100  Although this is not the first time
a federal court has chosen to implement a nontraditional voting method
as a remedy for a Voting Rights Act violation, more often than not, these
systems are discarded by the courts.101  For example, in 2009 the North-
ern District of Ohio in United States v. Euclid City School Board102 chose
to impose a similar proportional voting system known as limited voting in
lieu of a districting plan.103  Limited voting is used in multi-seat electoral
districts where each voter is only allowed to vote for one candidate de-
spite the fact that there is more than one seat available.104  The court
98. 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988).
99. McGhee v. Granville Cnty., 860 F.2d 110, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1988) (reiterating that
the first Gingles precondition requires a plaintiff to show they are numerous and compact
enough to draw a single-member district as a threshold matter in order to find liability,
which supports this implication).
100. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that at the
time Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) was decided, it was the first
time cumulative voting had been imposed as a remedy by a federal judge in the electoral
context).  However, because the decision was subsequently reversed, there continued to be
“no example in federal case law in which cumulative voting ha[d] been ordered and ap-
proved for elections to any office.” Id.  This all changed with Judge Robinson’s decision in
Port Chester.
101. See Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm’r, 376 F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004) (ex-
plaining that cumulative voting is not accepted as a remedy in Alabama); see also Sund-
quist, 145 F.3d at 829 (indicating that cumulative voting “is an inappropriate remedy for a
Section 2 claim”); White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058, 1071–73 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the Voting Rights Act cannot be used as a method to achieve proportional representation);
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994) (refusing to accept cumulative voting
as a valid remedy after determining that the system encourages racial bloc voting).
102. 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
103. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(addressing a claim that the at-large system of electing members of the school board was a
form of illegal vote dilution that polarized voting strength of African-Americans in the
city).
104. Id. at 755.
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discarded cumulative voting as a remedial option after determining that
the system is difficult both for a city to implement and for voters to un-
derstand.105  In this instance, the court used the “threshold of exclu-
sion”—or “the percentage of the vote that will guarantee the winning of a
seat even under the most unfavorable circumstances”—to determine
whether minorities would have the opportunity to elect the candidate of
their choice under the system of limited voting proposed by the Euclid
City School Board.106  The court found that the straightforward limited
voting proposal would remedy the vote dilution violation and provide an
opportunity for African-Americans to take part in the political process in
a manner that re-districting and cumulative voting could not.107
The first time a district court imposed cumulative voting in the electo-
ral setting was over fifteen years ago in Cane v. Worcester County,108 and
its decision was quickly reversed by the Fourth Circuit.109  In Cane, the
court selected a cumulative voting plan as a remedy for vote dilution after
determining that the straight voting system the county used to elect mem-
bers of the Board of Commissioners violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.110  The court concluded that cumulative voting would compel
candidates to appeal to all voters in the county with the hope that each
elected commissioner would therefore serve the interests of the entire
community.111  The court also indicated that a cumulative voting plan
would negate the necessity to fashion the type of districts that created the
vote dilution in the first place.112  However, the Fourth Circuit found that
by ordering the county to implement the cumulative voting system, the
district court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to give due deference to
another legislative judgment set forth on the record.”113  The legislative
findings introduced earlier in the case clearly expressed that the retention
of commissioner resident districts would be the best method to address
the needs and serve the interests of the county’s citizens.114  Because a
cumulative voting system would abolish the county’s preferred method of
electing commissioners, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to allow the county to determine an appropriate legally accept-
able remedy.115
105. Id. at 756.
106. Id. at 761 (quoting Dillard v. Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (M.D. Ala. 1988)).
107. Id. at 770.
108. 847 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1994).
109. Cane v. Worcester Cnty., Md., 35 F.3d 921, 929 (4th Cir. 1994).
110. Cane v. Worcester Cnty., Md., 847 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Md. 1994).
111. Id. at 373.
112. Id.
113. Cane, 35 F.3d at 928.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 929.
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In Port Chester, Judge Robinson explained that although cumulative
voting has been consistently rejected, it has never been disregarded as a
concept that may be legally acceptable in certain situations.116  Judge
Robinson reiterated that the usual case (similar to the situation in Cane)
was one in which the district court did not follow the proper procedure to
determine a legally acceptable remedy.117  Because nothing in the Voting
Rights Act suggests that the federal judiciary may simply impose any
remedy they see fit, all remedies must come from “the confines of the
state’s” system of government.118  Therefore, it is important for a court to
focus on the meaning of legally acceptable to determine the proper rem-
edy for a Voting Rights Act violation.  The definition of legally accept-
able requires an individualized consideration of the facts of each case.
The Eighth Circuit demonstrated the appropriate legal standard for
choosing a proposed remedial plan and the proper way to determine
whether that plan is legally acceptable in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine.119
When a Voting Rights Act violation has been established the district
court is required to develop a constitutional remedy.120  While this re-
sponsibility ultimately lies with the court, the defendants must always be
116. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
117. Id.
118. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) (indicating that federal
courts do not have a plethora of legal standards to employ when determining the appropri-
ate remedy for a Voting Rights Act violation).
119. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a
South Dakota legislative redistricting plan diluted the Native American vote in violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).  In Bone Shirt, the court found that the legislative plan
illegally “packed” Native Americans into one district, making it nearly impossible for an
Indian-preferred candidate to be elected. Id. at 1017.  Defendants argued that Native
Americans had little to no interest in politics due to the reservation system in South Da-
kota. Id. at 1022.  The court dismissed this argument, stating that “[t]he presumption that
South Dakota is relieved of liability for discriminatory voting practices because the reser-
vation system makes Native Americans less involved in state politics and more involved in
tribal matters is untenable.” Id. There is a long history of discrimination against Native
Americans in South Dakota. See generally Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act in
Indian Country: South Dakota, A Case Study, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 43 (2004) (detailing
the difficulty Native Americans in South Dakota have experienced in securing an equal
voice in the political process). Although the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
extended its protection to “language minorities” including Native Americans, Alaskan Na-
tives, Asian-Americans, and individuals of Spanish Heritage, there was a significant lack of
enforcement of the Act in South Dakota until fairly recently. Id. at 44, 45.  In fact, the
failure to comply with Section 5 of the Act was more deliberate and prolonged in South
Dakota than in many jurisdictions in the South.  Id. at 65.  This lack of enforcement was
due to a variety of factors, including lack of resources, past discrimination, language and
cultural barriers, and the depressed socioeconomic status of most Native Americans in the
state. Id. at 70.
120. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1022.
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given the first opportunity to propose a legally acceptable remedial
plan.121  If the defendants refuse or fail to submit an acceptable plan, the
district court may either adopt the plaintiff’s remedial plan or create its
own remedy.122  However, the court must defer to the plan submitted by
the governing legislative body if the plan is consistent with federal laws
and the Constitution.123
Determining if a plan is legally acceptable is a fact-specific inquiry that
requires the court to examine whether it will provide a meaningful “op-
portunity to exercise an electoral power that is commensurate with its
population.”124  The most important and obvious obligation is the correc-
tion of the specific Voting Rights Act violation.125  Secondly, the plan
must be narrowly tailored to attain population equality without using
multi-member districts; the third factor requires that the plan does not
violate the Voting Rights Act, particularly Sections 2 and 5.126  The last
requirement is that the plan does not “‘intrude upon state policy any
more than is necessary’” to comply with the Constitution.127  The plan
being challenged is seen as the benchmark from which the effect of voting
modifications are measured, thus it is necessary to compare the proposed
plan with the existing plan to ensure the proposed solution is a legally
acceptable alternative.128
In Port Chester, Judge Robinson focused on a court’s obligation to im-
pose a remedy that gives effect to the legislative policy judgments under-
lying the current electoral scheme in the jurisdiction.  He explained that
the degree of deference required by a district court is extremely strong,
emphasizing that “a district court may not substitute its own remedial
plan for a defendant’s legally acceptable one, even if it believes another
plan would be better.”129  After an initial determination that the Village
of Port Chester’s at-large system for electing its Board of Trustees pre-
vented Hispanic voters from participating equally in the political process,
Judge Robinson was faced with the task of implementing a remedial
plan.130  He used the aforementioned legal standards to evaluate whether
the Village of Port Chester’s at-large cumulative voting proposal or the
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
124. Id. at 449.
125. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1022.
126. Id. at 1022–23.
127. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982) (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783, 794–95 (1973)).
128. Bone Shirt, 461 F.3d at 1023.
129. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
130. Id. at 447.
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plaintiff’s single-member districting plan would be the most appropriate
remedy for the vote dilution claim and based his decision on the four
objective factors illustrated in Bone Shirt.131
First, Judge Robinson found that Port Chester’s cumulative voting sys-
tem would “cleanse the Section 2 violation” by giving Hispanics an equal
chance to partake in the political process and elect their preferred candi-
dates in the next election.132  He based his conclusion on a number of
factors, including the application of the threshold of exclusion.  When a
threshold of exclusion analysis is used to determine what the impact of
cumulative voting will be, there is always an assumption that the minority
population will plump their votes by distributing all of their votes to their
preferred candidate.133  This assumption is factored into the following
“‘worst case scenario’: (1) the majority runs the same number of candi-
dates as there are positions to be filled . . . ; and (2) the majority spreads
its votes evenly among its candidates, with no support for the minority-
preferred candidate.”134  According to the Report on Cumulative Voting,
prepared for the lawsuit,  if a minority population can exceed their
threshold of exclusion, vote as a bloc and plump all of their votes for one
candidate using cumulative voting, they are virtually guaranteed to elect
the candidate of their choice, even under the worst case scenario.135  Ac-
cording to the court, because the Hispanic population in Port Chester
voted cohesively in previous elections, it was reasonable to expect that
they would continue to vote as a bloc.136  As a result, Judge Robinson
concluded that it is likely that Hispanics would overcome the threshold of
exclusion using a system of cumulative voting and that the village’s pro-
posal was narrowly tailored to afford an equal opportunity for Hispanics
to participate meaningfully in the next election.137
The court also found that the cumulative voting plan met the third re-
quirement to be considered legally acceptable because it did not generate
a new Section 2 violation.138  However, it is important to note that the
court determined that this objective could only be accomplished with the
implementation of a corresponding voter education program because
Port Chester’s plan will only provide Hispanics an equal opportunity to
131. Id. at 447–52.
132. Id. at 449.
133. Id. at 450.
134. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
135. RICHARD ENGSTROM, REPORT ON CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR United States v.
Village of Port Chester ¶¶ 12–14 (2008), available at http://archive.fairvote.org/media/
engstrom.pdf.
136. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 451.
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take advantage of their electoral power if they understand how cumula-
tive voting works.139  Judge Robinson explained that cumulative voting is
a complex concept that is not a common method of voting in the United
States.140  Therefore, using the system as a remedy is counterproductive
to a Section 2 violation unless it contains an extensive educational pro-
gram that is tailored to the minority group.141  More specifically, the mi-
nority group needs to understand the concept of vote plumping in order
to elect their preferred candidate.142  In addition to a comprehensive edu-
cational program, the court explained that Port Chester must also address
the historical socioeconomic and education discrimination that helped to
create the vote dilution in the first place.143  As a condition of accepting
Port Chester’s cumulative voting plan, the court ordered the village to
address the barriers that might keep Hispanics from partaking in the new
system and determine what conditions are necessary for a non-discrimi-
natory implementation of cumulative voting.144
The final requirement for formulating a legally acceptable remedial
plan is that the plan upholds the Constitution without going against the
preferences of the legislative body.145  According a high level of defer-
ence to the defendant jurisdiction, Judge Robinson found that an exami-
nation of the plaintiff’s remedial plan was unnecessary because the only
criterion for judging the adequacy of Port Chester’s plan was “statutory
and constitutional acceptableness.”146  Once this determination has been
made, it is no longer necessary to evaluate whether or not the other re-
medial plans would pass constitutional scrutiny.  Judge Robinson empha-
sized that cumulative voting was more than appropriate in this situation
and met the final requirement because it had been developed and pro-
posed by the village itself.147
139. Id. (finding that Port Chester had a history of failing to employ the resources
necessary to provide Hispanics with an equal opportunity to vote).  The court found that
there was a language barrier to voting because Port Chester did not provide Spanish-
speaking poll workers or print election materials in Spanish. Id.  In order to implement
cumulative voting in an effective manner Port Chester was required to focus on the educa-
tion program and provide election day support for Spanish speakers. Id. at 451–52.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
142. Id. at 451 (citing ENGSTROM, supra note 135, at ¶¶ 37–38).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 451–52.
145. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1023 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Upham v.
Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982) (finding that a district court may not interfere with state
policy when choosing a reapportionment plan); Cane v. Worcester County, Md., 35 F.3d
921, 928 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the district court’s obligation to give deference to the
legislative body).
146. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
147. Id.
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Judge Robinson ultimately concluded that cumulative voting is legally
acceptable as a remedy under both the Voting Rights Act and New York
law.148  He also asserted that there is no case law rejecting cumulative
voting as a legally acceptable remedy and explained that the only reason
cumulative voting has been discarded in the past is because other judges
had been careless about following the appropriate standard of review for
Voting Rights Act violations by either ignoring the preferences of the
jurisdiction or hastily imposing the remedy without a valid determination
of its acceptableness.149
In contrast to Judge Robinson’s assertion however, the last time cumu-
lative voting was ordered and subsequently reversed was not in response
to a district court’s failure to follow the appropriate standard of review,
but because it failed to meet the third Gingles precondition.150  In Cousin
v. Sundquist,151 decided only four years after the district court’s decision
to implement cumulative voting was invalidated in Cane, the Sixth Circuit
rejected cumulative voting after determining that the plaintiffs had failed
to show that minority-preferred candidates had been unsuccessful in win-
ning elections.152 Gingles has provided courts with a solid test to deter-
mine whether or not a Voting Rights Act violation has occurred.  As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v.
Thompson153: “The possibility of increasing minority representation does
not compel a jurisdiction to achieve that outcome, unless the three [Gin-
gles] conditions have been met and the judge is satisfied that minority
voters have lacked an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process.”154  Although the main reason for the reversal in Cousin was due
to the failure to satisfy the Gingles conditions, the court made a point to
explain that they would have reversed even if the plaintiffs would have
met the conditions because cumulative voting is an inappropriate remedy
148. Id.
149. Id. at 448–49.
150. Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1998).
151. 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing the district court’s finding that plaintiffs
met the third Gingles precondition and had a successful Voting Rights Act claim).  In
Cousin, African-American voters alleged that the at-large method for electing judges in
Hamilton County violated the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 820.  Although the district court
found that they had a successful Section 2 claim, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
did not have a valid claim because they did not show that the minority-preferred candidate
was unsuccessful in previous elections. Id. at 826.  Although an African-American candi-
date had never been elected in the county, the winning White candidates were the minor-
ity-preferred candidates in previous elections. Id. at 825–26.
152. Id. at 825.
153. 116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997) (challenging the election of judges pursuant to a
county-wide election, and contending that it should be replaced with smaller districts).
154. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir.
1997).
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for a Section 2 claim.155  According to the court, “Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act specifically precludes its use to achieve proportional represen-
tation.”156  The court then quoted the Act itself, which states: “Provided,
that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a pro-
tected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the popula-
tion.”157  Because cumulative voting results in proportional
representation and also, proponents would argue, the advantage of imple-
menting cumulative voting as a remedy, it cannot possibly be regarded as
a legally acceptable remedy for violations of the Voting Rights Act.158
An examination of the first Gingles precondition that requires plaintiffs
to show they are numerous and compact enough to draw a single-member
district as a threshold matter to find liability also indicates that the uni-
verse of Section 2 remedies is limited to single-member districts.159  Ac-
cording to the court in Cousin, altering the current electoral scheme does
little but proclaim that race does in fact matter in an election.160  A re-
view of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Nipper v. Smith161 echoes this
assertion.162
The effect of the implementation of such a complex and controversial
system as that of cumulative voting in the Village of Port Chester remains
to be seen.  Despite the controversial nature of cumulative voting, the
prescription of the system by Judge Robinson has not been challenged
and the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether such proportional vot-
ing systems are legally acceptable remedies under the Voting Rights Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
The implementation of an alternative voting system in any form alters
the meaning of the right to vote.  The geographic representation that un-
derlies the United States’ “consent-based republican form of govern-
ment” has endured because of the stability that has been created by the
155. Cousin, 145 F.3d at 829.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
158. Id.
159. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 n.17 (1986) (noting that the single-
member district is the appropriate standard to use when evaluating Voting Rights Act
claims).  The Court explained that a minority group is required to prove that it can make
up a majority in a single-member district. Id. at 51.
160. Cousin, 145 F.3d at 830.
161. 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (criticizing cumulative voting as a remedy in judicial
election cases).
162. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994).  The court explains that
cumulative voting is a race-conscious remedy that would encourage racial-bloc voting and
encroach on the same practices the Equal Protection Clause is designed to prevent. Id.
2011] CUMULATIVE VOTING 543
“winner-take-all” aspect of majority rule.163  For most elected offices, dis-
tricting is the method of representation that is the most consistent with
the traditional voting conception that “rests on the republican principle
that the actions of government must be based upon the consent of the
governed.”164  However, it is necessary to determine whether majority
rule actually reflects the will of most people and to ensure that minority
voters have meaningful access to the ballot.165  The Voting Rights Act
requires that race be taken into account when drawing districts; however,
race-conscious districting has often been found to be unconstitutional.166
Because of this, the restrictions placed on the creation of major-
ity–minority districts in Shaw v. Reno seemingly conflict with the race-
conscious agenda of the Voting Rights Act.167  Proponents of alternative
systems argue that the implementation of cumulative voting is a way to
resolve this conflict.168
Cumulative voting advocates assert that the system excludes racial con-
siderations altogether and enhances opportunities for cohesive minority
groups to elect candidates of their choice.169  This system was the first to
be adopted in direct response to allegations of minority vote dilution and
is now used to elect the governing bodies of fifty local governments in
four states.170  The first cumulative voting elections were held in response
to Voting Rights Act settlements at the end of the 1980s and the begin-
ning of the 1990s.171  These elections have an impressive record of in-
163. James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting
Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 365
(2002).
164. Id. at 364 (quoting James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilu-
tion of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443,
458 (1999)).
165. See id. at 380 (explaining that geographic representation has often been used to
hinder the consent-based form of government by excluding minority groups).
166. See Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Cumulative Voting Preferable to Single-Member
Districting?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 197, 201 (1995) (arguing that “race-conscious districting is
constitutionally questionable”).
167. Mulroy, supra note 82, at 335.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 350 (arguing that alternative voting systems are effective tools to
strengthen minority representation); see also Briffault, supra note 45, at 422 (summarizing
cumulative voting advocate Lani Guinier’s attack on the Voting Rights Act and
districting).
170. ENGSTROM, supra note 135; see also SHAUN BOWLER, ET AL., ELECTORAL RE-
FORM AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION—LOCAL EXPERIMENTS WITH ALTERNATIVE
ELECTIONS 1, 5 (2003), available at http://www.ohiostatepress.org/Books/Book%20PDFs/
Bowler%20Electoral.pdf (arguing that cumulative voting results in greater minority
representation).
171. Mulroy, supra note 82, at 349.
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creased racial minority representation.172  Minority candidates from
different minority groups across the country won elections for the first
time in decades, and in some cases for the very first time, under a system
of cumulative voting.173  The results include the election of a Native
American candidate in Sisseton, South Dakota, a Hispanic candidate in
Alamogordo, New Mexico, and African-American candidates in Peoria,
Illinois.174  Most recently, the Village of Port Chester used cumulative
voting to elect its first Latino candidate to public office.175  With just over
ten percent of the vote, Luis Marino, a Peruvian-born custodial worker
earned a seat on the Village’s six-member Board of Trustees.176  Accord-
ing to the Cumulative Voting Educational Program Exit Poll Report,
more than ninety-five percent of all voters took full advantage of cumula-
tive voting by casting all six of their votes for one candidate.177  However,
the degree of vote plumping varied based on factors such as race and
education.  It was estimated that thirty-four percent of voters plumped all
six of their votes on one candidate, and minority voters, including voters
whose primary language was not English and voters who did not com-
plete high school, were the most likely to report vote plumping.178  Race
and ethnicity were also strongly related to the way that voters cast their
ballots.  It was reported that 51% percent of Latino voters and 41% per-
cent of African-American voters cast all of their votes for one candidate,
while only 27% percent of White voters gave all of their votes to one
candidate.179  Also, because a large amount of Latino voters indicated
that they knew how to plump their votes in order to elect the candidate of
their choice, it is apparent that the extensive voter education system em-
ployed by Port Chester at the order of Judge Robinson was successful.180
According to the report, the election of Mr. Marino supports the conclu-
sion that at least some voters plumped their votes because he received
more votes than total voters in five different districts on election day.181
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Kirk Semple, First Latino Board Member Is Elected in Port Chester, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/nyregion/17chester.html?_r=1.
176. Id.  Mr. Marino was not the only minority candidate elected at this time. Id.
Republican Joseph Kenner was also elected, becoming the first African-American board
member in Port Chester. Id.
177. DAVID C. KIMBALL & MARTHA KROPF, CUMULATIVE VOTING EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAM EXIT POLL REPORT, PORT CHESTER, N.Y. 31 (2011), available at http://
www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/PCExitPollFinalReport.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Although cumulative voting may provide minority groups with a better
chance to elect their preferred candidates, it does so by sacrificing many
important aspects of our consent-based, representative government.182
Despite the fact that racial bloc voting in the form of majority–minority
districts has been regarded as constitutionally questionable since the deci-
sion in Shaw, racial bloc voting in the form of cumulative voting has been
implemented as a remedy for a Voting Rights Act violation.183  There-
fore, although cumulative voting may eliminate some types of gerryman-
dering, it is far from race-neutral.184  In Shaw, the Court stated that
“[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions . . . [and] threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters . . . .”185
Interestingly enough, by encouraging minority groups to cast all their
votes for one minority candidate when they might have initially sup-
ported a White majority candidate, cumulative voting assists in the crea-
tion of multiple competing racial groups, thereby creating the exact result
the Court feared.186
Even though cumulative voting may have been successful when it was
adopted as a judicial remedy for a specific Voting Rights Act violation, it
is generally a very poor system for achieving a proportional result.187
This is true because it takes a large amount of resources, party control,
and coordination of voting to ensure minority success.188  This coordina-
tion may be easy to achieve in simple situations, but is nearly impossible
in situations where a minority group may elect multiple candidates or
when the minority group must make specific strategic choices in order to
elect the candidate of their choice.189  Cumulative voting failed to achieve
a proportional result in Great Britain when various forms were used in
multiple elections at the end of the nineteenth century.190  Strategic er-
182. Tucker, supra note 163, at 437–38 (explaining that any change in the way an
election is conducted changes the meaning of consent, representation, and the right to
vote).
183. See Mulroy, supra note 82, at 348–49 (discussing the conflict between the Voting
Rights Act and Shaw, and advocating the adoption of alternative voting systems).
184. Id.
185. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
186. But see Mulroy, supra note 82, at 352 (maintaining that although it is troubling,
the balkanization argument is unpersuasive).
187. Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Sys-
tems in the United States, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1119, 1151 (1998).
188. Id. at 1151–52.
189. Id. at 1152.
190. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the British political system, see VERNON BOGDA-
NOR, THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY SYSTEM: THE REFERENDUM AND ELECTORAL REFORM
IN BRITISH POLITICS 111–18 (1981) (discussing the varying forms of proportional represen-
tation and the negative consequences of adopting such systems in Great Britain).  In his
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rors frustrated the proportional effect and cast doubt on all schemes that
sought to achieve a proportional result.191
If cumulative voting was widely adopted in the United States, it is
likely that this experience would repeat.192  There has been only one
long-term cumulative voting experiment in the United States—Illinois
used cumulative voting from 1870 to 1980 in state house elections to fill
three-member districts in the lower house.193  The Illinois constitutional
convention adopted cumulative voting for three main reasons.  First, the
convention aimed to make the house more representative of the electo-
rate by increasing minority representation across the state.194  Second,
the convention wanted to give voters the option to maximize their influ-
ence by plumping votes for their first-choice candidate.195  Third, the con-
vention hoped to eliminate sectional divisions between the parties by
ensuring that some Republicans would represent northern Illinois (then
dominated by Republicans) while some would represent southern Illinois
(then dominated by Democrats).196  Because nearly every district gave
one of its three seats to a candidate from the minority party, the Illinois
system was effective in fulfilling the first two objectives of reducing geo-
graphic divisions and increasing minority representation.197  However,
cumulative voting failed to meet the third objective of enhancing individ-
ual voting decisions by increasing a voter’s influence because “[t]he ma-
jority party in a district would often nominate two candidates, and the
minority party, just one.”198  There was tight control over the nominating
process and parties failed to run full slates for fear of vote dilution and
book, Bogdanor explained that although proportional voting systems were created to pro-
tect minorities, when implemented in Britain, they had the opposite effect and “en-
couraged the development of a party machine whose purpose it was to ensure that only
majorities were represented.” Id. at 104.  According to Bogdanor, in order for a political
system to be successful, the government must act in a manner that is consistent with the
dominant social views of that time. Id. at 3–4.
191. BOGDANOR, supra note 190, at 104.
192. McKaskle, supra note 187, at 1153.
193. See Tucker, supra note 163, at 434. See also FairVote Illinois, Documentary on
Cumulative Voting, YOUTUBE (June 9, 008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oavixTnQ
4eA.
194. Charles W. Dunn, Cumulative Voting Problems in Illinois Legislative Elections, 9
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 627, 631–32 (1972) (exploring the history of cumulative voting in Illi-
nois and concluding that a system of single-member districting is preferable).
195. Id. at 632.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 633.
198. Id. at 635 (describing one of the problems associated with using cumulative vot-
ing in the electoral context); see also Tucker, supra note 163, at 435 (explaining that during
these primary elections in Illinois, the major parties would collude and nominate two can-
didates and have the minority party nominate only one).
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party collusion.199  Therefore, cumulative voting diminished the new-
found voting power by reducing the amount of political competition and
in most elections third parties failed to elect any representatives at all.200
Although proving that cumulative voting can co-exist with a two-party
system of government, Illinois’ experience with cumulative voting dem-
onstrates that by limiting voting choices to maintain a stable two-party
system, cumulative voting often replicates the same defects it is said to
correct.201  Illinois abolished cumulative voting in 1980 when citizens
voted to reduce the number of seats in the Illinois House of Representa-
tives.202  According to Judge Abner Mikva,203 the main reason the system
was repealed by constitutional referendum was because most people
never understood how to cast their votes in an effective manner.204  He
also argues that the repeal of cumulative voting had little to do with cu-
mulative voting itself and was the result of the negative public perception
of the Illinois legislature after it voted to give its members a pay raise.205
The reasons for the repeal of cumulative voting are not as significant as
the fact that the system has not been reinstated as a voting mechanism for
the state legislature.206
199. Dunn, supra note 194, at 634 (noting that cumulative voting weakened voter
power by reducing political competition).  The necessity of increased party control under a
system of cumulative voting was recognized by an early cumulative voting analyst, Blaine
F. Moore, in 1909. BLAINE F. MOORE, THE UNIVERSITY STUDIES—THE HISTORY OF CU-
MULATIVE VOTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN ILLINOIS, 1870–1908 at 33 (1909),
available at https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/9015/historyofcumu-
lat03moor.pdf?sequence=1 (supporting cumulative voting as an alternative system but rec-
ognizing that it did not have an exact proportional result).  Moore explained that it is
impossible to have a small amount of party control when using cumulative voting because
“several thousand voters coming to the polls each with three votes to distribute as he sees
fit, without a certain amount of party supervision can lead to nothing but confusion, injus-
tice and misrepresentation.” Id. at 32.
200. Dunn, supra note 194, at 635; see also David Kenney, No Cumulative Voting,
ILLINOIS ISSUES, Nov. 1976, available at http://www.lib.niu.edu/1976/ii761112.html (explain-
ing the history of cumulative voting, and arguing that it is a faulty system since it results in
meaningless contests).
201. Tucker, supra note 163, at 434, 437.
202. See Cumulative Voting—Illinois, supra note 22 (illustrating that when cumulative
voting was replaced with simple majority voting, the house was reduced by fifty-nine
seats).
203. Mikva, a visiting professor of law at the University of Chicago, served as chief
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from 1979–1994.
204. Abner J. Mikva, The Case for Cumulative Voting, ILL. COUNTRY LIVING, Feb.
2001, at 4, available at http://www.lib.niu.edu/2001/ic010204.html.
205. Id. at 6.
206. See id. (indicating that returning to a system of cumulative voting would be
difficult).
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Except for the lower house in Illinois, all alternative voting systems
utilized in the United States have been in the corporate context or at the
local level.207  Cumulative voting is appropriate in the corporate setting
because voting is administered through proxies allowing shareholders to
delegate their votes in advance to advocates of opposing positions.208
This allows each side to know exactly how many proxies it has acquired
before the actual vote and to determine the best manner to allocate the
votes in order to attain the desired electoral goal.209  Because elections
for public officials are conducted by secret ballot and in person, the only
way to implement an efficient system of vote targeting would be for the
public to take an extreme step away from these traditional voting con-
cepts.210  It is quite unlikely that the public will agree to abolish the secret
ballot and adopt a proxy system—the two characteristics that make cor-
porate cumulative voting effective.211  Also, in a corporate situation,
shareholder voters are more likely to be sophisticated and have a better
understanding of cumulative voting as compared to the average electoral
voter.212  Because of this, except for in the simplest situation, it will be
extremely difficult to knowingly allocate votes in an efficient manner
under a system of cumulative voting.  Casting votes ineffectively will re-
sult in a large amount of wasted votes, diminish the influence of minority
voters, and thereby defeat the purpose of cumulative voting as a viable
alternative voting scheme.213
Local governments in small towns have less interest in maintaining ge-
ographic representation and are the strongest candidates for proportional
voting systems.214  More specifically, school boards are the most appro-
priate arenas for cumulative voting because they often conduct at-large
elections which make it easier to adopt the modified election rules of
cumulative voting.215  They will have less difficulty in administering elec-
tions and can better facilitate relational representation because of the
small size of the voting population.216  However, even if the goal of cu-
mulative voting is met and minority groups are able to elect the candi-
dates of their choice, there is no guarantee that they will have a
207. McKaskle, supra note 187, at 1151–54.
208. Id. at 1153–54.
209. Id. at 1154.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Cf. Kenney, supra note 200 (emphasizing that cumulative voting created serious
confusion among voters when it was used for lower house elections in Illinois because it is
extremely difficult to understand).
213. McKaskle, supra note 187, at 1154.
214. Lewyn, supra note 166, at 227; Tucker, supra note 163, at 397–98 (2002).
215. Tucker, supra note 163, at 398–99.
216. Id. at 438.
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significant amount of policy making power in the legislature.217  As legal
scholars, such as Dr. James Thomas Tucker,218 have explained, “fair allo-
cation of seats” is not always commensurate with “fairness in the alloca-
tion of power or a more responsive, accountable, and representative
government” as cumulative voting often makes it easier for disruptive,
fringe, and single-issue candidates to be elected.219  Cumulative voting
may create political fragmentation and deny the majority party of an ef-
fective working majority.220  There is also the possibility that if a specific
group has a majority in the legislature, they may have little to no incen-
tive to represent minority groups that have obtained proportional repre-
sentation.221  Additionally, it may be necessary for minority groups that
have a plurality of seats to bargain with other groups that have enough
seats to establish a coalition with the majority.222  In this sense, cumula-
tive voting has the possibility of creating “token representation” which is,
according to cumulative voting advocates, one of the fundamental
problems of districting that proportional representation is supposed to
correct.223  Therefore, except in very specialized circumstances, cumula-
tive voting as an electoral system does not guarantee proportional repre-
sentation.  More importantly, it would not consistently provide a
satisfactory alternative to single-member districts.
Although judges have the power to implement a proposed remedy,
they have a limited role in deciding what remedy is appropriate.  Despite
the fact that Judge Robinson determined that cumulative voting was the
proper remedy for Port Chester, the involvement of the federal govern-
ment in the village’s Voting Rights Act case raises concerns about the
proper role of the federal and state governments.
217. Id. at 420.
218. Dr. James Thomas Tucker served as a senior trial attorney with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Civil Rights Division-Voting Section.  James Thomas Tucker Biography,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/James-Thomas-Tucker/e/B002T3VWOE (last vis-
ited July 17, 2011).  He works with the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) as a voting
rights consultant, and has published over a dozen books and journal articles discussing
minority voting rights. Id.
219. Tucker, supra note 163, at 420 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
220. Lewyn, supra note 166, at 214.
221. Tucker, supra note 163, at 420.
222. Id.
223. Id. (explaining the election of minority candidates may or may not increase the
power of minority groups); see also Lewyn, supra note 166 (contending that the election of
minority candidates with cumulative voting may result in intraparty warfare and collusion
between political parties, making parties less effective).
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V. CONCLUSION
Implementing cumulative voting in an attempt to deliberately reduce
the White majority means that the Voting Rights Act is now being used to
regulate not only the process by which voting is carried out, but the re-
sults of voting.  The issue in Port Chester was not that Hispanics were not
allowed to vote or that their right to vote was being hindered in any way,
but that no Hispanic had won an election.  The purpose of the Voting
Rights Act was to outlaw discriminatory voting practices, not to provide
minority voters with a guaranteed way to get their preferred candidate
into office.  Because the success of cumulative voting is based on the
strategy of a specific voting group, it is likely to have adverse conse-
quences on the political system as a whole.
While the implementation of cumulative voting at the electoral level
may be a worthwhile experiment for state and local governments, it
should not be widely adopted in the United States.  If properly imple-
mented in specific situations, cumulative voting may provide voters with a
greater chance to elect their preferred candidate, but not without forfeit-
ing many important aspects of our government.224  If cumulative voting is
truly proportional, there will be a better chance that elections will reflect
the will of the people; however, there will be no guarantee that minority
interests will not be subsequently suppressed in the legislature unless
there is a complete departure from majority rule.225
For cumulative voting to be successful, voters must know if they are a
part of the majority and the community must provide an extensive voter
education program for all citizens.  Therefore, cumulative voting is only
appropriate in small communities that hold nonpartisan elections and
have a smaller population of citizens to educate.  Where a community is
dominated by a specific group, voters will have a better chance of increas-
ing their representation through vote plumping because they will know if
they are a part of the majority and will be able to vote accordingly.226  In
contrast, if voters do not know whether they are a part of the majority or
the minority because their city is so large, it will be difficult to employ an
appropriate voting strategy, which could result in the majority becoming
the minority.227
This is not to say that Judge Robinson’s decision to implement cumula-
tive voting in Port Chester is without merit.  Although there are many
valid reasons cumulative voting has been discarded by most courts, if it is
applied to the right community for the right reasons, it has proven to be a
224. Id. at 437–38.
225. Id. at 437.
226. Lewyn, supra note 166, at 227.
227. Id.
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successful tool for increased minority representation.  In elections for
small legislative bodies, such as the Board of Trustees in Port Chester,
cumulative voting will normally do away with redistricting because at-
large voting is only possible when five or ten seats are at stake.228  How-
ever, in large cities, cumulative voting will still require the use of multi-
member districts in order to reduce the complexity of an already complex
ballot.229  Therefore, because cumulative voting does not eliminate the
need for redistricting in “big-city, state, or congressional elections” and
redistricting creates gerrymandering, it follows that cumulative voting
does not dispel the practice of gerrymandering and should not be used as
a remedy for Voting Rights Act violations.230
It would certainly be rash to forgo considering an option that may help
to obtain America’s promise of universal suffrage, but a broad solution
that creates the same problem it is meant to remedy is not the answer.
Courts may be headed in the right direction by moving slowly and testing
alternative voting systems in small jurisdictions, but that is where these
alternative systems should stay.  Cumulative voting is, in general, a
clumsy and defective system for obtaining a proportional result.  The
amount of coordination required to obtain a proportional result indicates
that in most situations the system will work poorly.  This does not mean
that cumulative voting should be rejected completely.
Although we live in a very racially diverse democracy, we are nowhere
near post-racial.  Alternative systems may resolve certain defects of our
current electoral system, while creating some new ones of their own.  It
may be time to consider alternatives other than race-conscious districting,
but the substitution of race-conscious voting is not the answer for most
jurisdictions.  It is also important to recognize that any model for ob-
taining the consent of the governed will be imperfect in today’s racially
charged society.  If we are ready to change the meaning of our represen-
tative government by abolishing majority rule to implement a propor-
tional system, then some alternative voting systems may be appropriate.
228. Id. at 211.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 212.
